PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS AND COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS

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The private foundation has long been favoured by wealthy individuals and families as a vehicle for accomplishing their charitable objectives. A particularly attractive feature of the private foundation is that it allows donors to retain administrative control over assets donated while realizing the tax benefits of charitable giving. In recent years, however, new anti-avoidance rules under the Income Tax Act have imposed stringent limitations upon gifts to private foundations, and donors have looked to alternative structures to direct their gifts to charities. The most significant of these is the donor-advised or donor-directed fund administered by a community foundation. The establishment of such a fund provides the tax benefits of a gift to a public foundation, while affording the donor some degree of control through a consultative or advisory function. Keywords: Charities; foundations; private foundations; charitable donations; trusts.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, we have seen the rise of two divergent trends in Canada’s charitable and not-for-profit sector—“the third sector,” as it has been dubbed. On the one hand, this sector has experienced tremendous growth, evidenced by a 33 percent increase in the number of registered charities from the 1980s and a 300 percent increase from the 1960s.1 On the other hand, there have been significant and continuing cutbacks in government spending on the arts, education, and health care. Thus, a growing demand for funds to sustain charitable activities has encountered a shrinking public resource pool available to support philanthropic endeavours.

In an attempt to ease the pressure on the not-for-profit sector, the federal government in the 1997 budget introduced amendments to the Income Tax Act2 that

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were designed to encourage private philanthropy. These amendments are a welcome addition to the Canadian legal landscape in that they provide enhanced tax incentives for charitable giving. However, along with these provisions, the government enacted new and stringent anti-avoidance rules. The provisions contained in subsection 118.1(16) of the Act in particular have been the subject of much criticism. One commentator, for example, has suggested that these rules will “more than undercut the ameliorating changes proposed in the rest of the Budget vis-à-vis charitable donations.”

The anti-avoidance rules are considered to impose particularly onerous restrictions on the funding of private foundations. The purpose of this article is to examine how the Act differs in its treatment of private foundations as compared with other charities and to consider this differential treatment in the context of donors’ motivations in selecting a specific vehicle for their charitable giving. Having regard to those motivations, the article will examine the extent to which community foundations may present an attractive alternative to private foundations.

**TYPES OF CHARITIES**

The Act contemplates that charities will be designated as charitable organizations or charitable foundations; charitable foundations, in turn, are categorized as public or private. The designation is not affected by the form of the entity—it may be a trust, a corporation, or an unincorporated association. The designation will affect the disbursement quota requirements of the charity, the rules relating to the gifts made to it, the activities that are permitted, and the activities that are prohibited.

Briefly, a charitable organization is an organization that meets all of the following requirements:

- all of the organization’s resources are devoted exclusively to charitable activities carried on by it;
- more than 50 percent of the directors, trustees, or officers of the organization deal at arm’s length with each other and with each of the other directors, trustees, or officers; and
- not more than 50 percent of the capital of the organization has been contributed or otherwise paid by one person or members of a group of persons who do not deal with each other at arm’s length (other than the Crown in right of Canada, a province or a municipality, or another registered charity other than a private foundation).

Typically, charitable organizations primarily engage in direct charitable activity. Examples include hospitals, universities, churches, art galleries, and museums.

A charitable foundation is a corporation or trust that is operated exclusively for charitable purposes, subject to the restriction that no part of its income may be paid to or available for the personal benefit of any member, shareholder, trustee, etc., of the foundation, and that is not a charitable organization. Charitable foundations generally act as conduits for distributing funds to charitable organizations.
As noted above, a charitable foundation may be public or private. Under the definition of “public foundation,” at least 50 percent of the directors, trustees, or officers must deal at arm’s length with each other and with each of the other directors, trustees, or officers, and not more than 50 percent of the capital of the foundation may be contributed or otherwise paid by one person or members of a group of persons who do not deal with each other at arm’s length (again, with exceptions for gifts from the Crown and charities other than private foundations). A private foundation is a charitable foundation that does not meet these criteria.

Essentially, a private foundation is one with either a non-arm’s-length board or one that has received more than half of its capital from a single source. The classic family foundation, which has a majority of family members on its board and has been funded by one person or a related group, clearly meets this description. However, other charities also may fit within this category. It should be noted that, while a charity will be characterized as a charitable organization or a public or private charitable foundation at the time of registration by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (“the CCRA”), that status may be re-evaluated and the charity redesignated in the future. Thus, while a charitable organization or public foundation may receive funding from a variety of sources, the charity may be put offside by a large single gift or a series of large gifts. In the past few years, this possibility has become a reality for some public foundations that have inadvertently become the recipients of significant gifts from dotcom millionaires (among others). The CCRA is aware of this problem and has indicated in private conversation that so long as the large gift is an isolated incident, the charity will not be reclassified for this reason. Some commentators have noted that while the administrative position is comforting, it would be better if legislative change were made in this area to give a greater comfort level to charities that are fortunate enough to be the recipients of such generous gifts.

PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS

Reasons for Establishing and Giving to a Private Foundation

It must be recognized at the outset that in addition to the benefits that flow from any charitable gift—principally, the satisfaction of supporting worthy causes and the consequent tax relief—the private foundation offers a number of advantages for the donor that public foundations and charitable organizations may not be able to match. Some of these are related to the donor’s philanthropic objectives and the manner in which they may be implemented over time. Since, as contemplated by the definition in the Act, the board of directors of a private foundation does not deal at arm’s length with the donor, the donor remains in a position to control—or, at a minimum, to influence—the future disposition of the gifted assets despite having parted with their ownership. This retention of control preserves flexibility in the event that the donor’s charitable objectives change, or new public needs arise to which the donor would like to respond. The donor is also protected against the situation that may arise in the case of a gift to a public foundation or
operating charity, where the charity’s funding priorities change after the gift has been made, in a manner inconsistent with the donor’s intentions.

Furthermore, the operation of a private foundation can become a charitable work in itself, allowing the donor (or donors, in the case of a family foundation) to feel more involved with the public benefits that flow from the gift than might be the case where a single, one-time gift is made to a large public foundation. Wealthy individuals may also regard the establishment of, and active involvement in, such a foundation as a valuable means by which to instill altruistic and philanthropic values in family members, particularly children and grandchildren.

There are, however, other features that make a private foundation attractive, which have less to do with philanthropic motives and the public benefit that will eventually result from the use of the funds or assets donated. In addition to the donor’s ability to retain control over the distribution of income from the foundation’s assets, the donor retains control over the investment of those assets. Many donors who, through their own business and investment acumen, have generated the wealth that allows them to make substantial charitable gifts may be concerned that the boards of public charities do not possess such acumen. Even where the assets donated are in the form of marketable securities, the private foundation structure allows the donor to “play the market” and select those investments that he or she believes will maximize return for the foundation. Continued control over the assets gifted may be even more important where the assets constitute shares or debt of the donor’s corporation. A gift of such shares to a private foundation can be made without triggering a capital gain and, through the composition of the board of the foundation, allows control of the shares to remain in the family. Where the assets take such a form, a gift to a public foundation or an operating charity and the consequent loss of control may simply not be an option.  

Related to the issue of control is that of privacy. Since the board of the private foundation is generally composed of family members and trusted advisers, the donor can make the gift without necessarily disclosing details that he or she may prefer to keep confidential. Maintaining privacy may be particularly desirable in the case of private company shares or debt, where the disclosure of valuation and other details may provide insight into the underlying business. Such discretion may be impossible to maintain in the case of a gift to a public foundation, for a number of reasons. The public foundation may, for example, wish to disclose some of this information in its annual report. In addition, the public foundation may require a detailed review of the operations of the business in order to determine the value of the proposed gift of shares, not only at the time of the gift but also for each year in which the gift is not monetized or converted into cash. The risk to the donor is that crucial information about his or her business may thus fall into the hands of competitors—some of whom may even hold positions on the board of the foundation.

Paradoxically, while a gift to a private foundation may preserve privacy concerning the gift itself, it can also bring the donor public recognition and identification with the foundation’s charitable work. If the foundation bears the donor’s
name, it can provide a lasting reminder of the continuing contribution of the individual and his or her family to the community. Alternatively, the donor may establish the foundation in the name of some other individual whom he or she wishes to memorialize.

Lastly, the private foundation offers the donor advantages in matters of timing. The donor can make gifts at those points in time that best serve his or her fiscal and tax-planning objectives. The donor can make a charitable gift and realize all of the associated tax benefits without having to immediately select the charity or program that will ultimately benefit from the gift. This determination will subsequently be made, while perhaps not by the donor personally, by a board over which (as discussed above) the donor may be able to exert considerable influence.

**Factors Limiting the Attractiveness of the Private Foundation**

All of the foregoing makes it apparent that, when compared with other charities, the private foundation is something of a “half-way house.” While a gift to a private foundation may represent a voluntary divestiture of the legal and equitable interests in the property conveyed (and thus satisfy the requirements of the Act for the issuance of an official receipt), the donor or the donor’s family may be able to retain many of the benefits of control. Furthermore, because of that control, the private foundation is often employed as much to achieve the donor’s estate-planning and wealth management objectives as to give effect to the donor’s philanthropic motives.

It is important, however, not to overstate the personal benefits to the donor of using a private foundation as a charitable vehicle. While the non-arm’s-length relationship between the donor and the foundation’s board may afford the donor some degree of control over investment and disposition decisions, the foundation is nevertheless a charity and subject to the same regulatory oversight as public charities. Thus, in Ontario for example, a private foundation is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), and that office can take such actions as are necessary to ensure that the non-arm’s-length relationship between the donor and the charity does not give rise to conflicts of interest or other forms of abuse. The foundation will also have to comply with the obligations imposed by the Charities Accounting Act, certain provisions of which will be particularly relevant in cases where the property gifted to the foundation constitutes shares of a private company. Where a charity directly or indirectly controls a corporation, section 2(2) of the Charities Accounting Act provides that the corporation must furnish financial information to the PGT if it is requested to do so. Thus, in addition to the information that the foundation is required to provide to the PGT, the PGT is entitled to information provided directly by the controlled corporation.

Also significantly limiting the utility and attractiveness of the private foundation in Ontario is the Charitable Gifts Act. In essence, that Act prohibits a charity from directly or indirectly holding more than 10 percent of the interest in a business carried on for profit. Where such an interest becomes vested in a
charity, the charity is under an obligation to dispose of any interest in excess of the 10 percent threshold within seven years. Clearly, these provisions represent a significant obstacle to a donor who seeks to transfer control of a private operating company into a private foundation.15

Perhaps the most significant disincentives to the use of the private foundation are those found in the Income Tax Act and, in particular, the recent amendments referred to previously. It is necessary to examine these in some detail.

**CHANGES TO THE ACT IN RECENT YEARS RELATING TO GIFTS TO CHARITIES**

**Increasing the Limit on Charitable Credits**

The income tax rules relating to charitable giving have undergone significant changes, particularly since 1996. For the most part, these changes have been welcome, in that they have enhanced the tax benefits of certain types of charitable giving—in particular, gifts of publicly traded securities. For private foundations, however, the new rules are much less favourable. The enhanced tax benefits are not available for gifts made to a private foundation, and there are significant new restrictions on such gifts.

Subsection 118.1(1) provides in the definition of “total charitable gifts” that gifts made, inter alia, to a registered charity (which includes charitable organizations, private foundations, and public foundations) qualify as charitable gifts. Individuals are entitled to a federal tax credit for gifts that fall within this definition. The credit is 16 percent for the first $200 gifted and 29 percent for gifts over $200. For a taxpayer at the top marginal rate, the credit is similar to a deduction once provincial tax considerations are factored in.16

There is a limit on the use of charitable credits for income tax purposes in any year. This limit was increased from the 20 percent level that had been in place from 1972 to the end of 1995 and the 50 percent level articulated in the 1996 budget. The rule now provides that an individual’s total charitable gifts for a taxation year cannot exceed 75 percent of the individual’s taxable income for that year. Any credits that are not utilized in a particular year can be carried forward for five years.17

Gifts that are made by will and properly structured are deemed to have been made in the year of death,18 and the donation limit for gifts in the year of death has been increased from 20 percent to 100 percent in respect of gifts after 1995. Any portion of the donation that cannot be used in the year of death may be carried back one year. The donation limit of 100 percent also applies to the amount carried back.

The capital gains tax rules are relevant to the gifting of capital property since, in many cases, donors will realize a capital gain on such gifts. A gift is a disposition of property. The general rule, set out in paragraph 69(1)(b) and subsection 70(5), is that where gifts of capital property are made, inter vivos or by will, the taxpayer or the testator is deemed to have received proceeds of disposition equal
to the fair market value of the property gifted. In addition, with respect to gifts of
depreciable property, recapture of capital cost allowance may arise. Subsection
118.1(6) was intended to alleviate this potential tax burden and provides that an
individual may elect as proceeds of disposition of the gifted property, an amount
between the adjusted cost base of the property and its fair market value. The
elected amount would then be the taxpayer’s proceeds of disposition for deter-
mining the capital gain and also the amount to be used for determining the value
of the charitable gift.

The recent amendments to the Act have encouraged the donation of capital
property to charities by permitting an additional credit in respect of a percentage
of the capital gains. In addition to the 75 percent limit noted above, an additional
claim can be made for 25 percent of the taxable capital gains realized on the dis-
position of the gifted capital property (to the extent that they were not excluded
from taxable income by the lifetime capital gains exemption in section 110.6) and
25 percent of any recapture of capital cost allowance (in respect of a gift of depre-
ciable property) included in income as a result of the making of the gift.

In the case of a donation of publicly traded shares to charities other than private
foundations, an additional benefit involves a reduction in the amount required to
be included in income for tax purposes.

Paragraph 38(a.1) was introduced into the Act in 1998 (applicable after Feb-
ruary 18, 1997). At that time, paragraph 38(a.1) provided that the rate of inclusion
for capital gains realized on the donation of certain shares would be 37.5 percent
where the following criteria were satisfied:

- The donation must have been made after February 18, 1997 and before 2002.
- The shares must have been listed on a prescribed stock exchange.
- The donor must have actually gifted the shares and not merely the proceeds
  from their sale.
- The donee must have been a registered charity other than a private foundation.

The rate of inclusion provided for in paragraph 38(a.1) represented one-half of
the 75 percent rate of inclusion that was applicable in 1997. With the lowering of
the rate of inclusion from three-quarters to two-thirds in the February 2000 budget,
and its further lowering from two-thirds to one-half in the October 2000 economic
statement, the rates of inclusion under paragraph 38(a.1) have been lowered accord-
ingly. The inclusion rates applicable to donations of shares caught by paragraph
38(a.1) are now as follows:

- three-eighths for donations made before February 28, 2000 (that is, one-
  half of three-quarters, which is the inclusion rate for this period); and
- one-third for donations made after February 27, 2000 and before October
  18, 2000 (that is, one-half of two-thirds, which is the inclusion rate for this
  period); and
• one-quarter for donations made after October 17, 2000 and before 2002 (that is, one-half of one-half, which is the inclusion rate for this period).

As noted above, the 1997 budget measures provided that the special tax assistance for donations of public company shares would apply only to donations made after February 18, 1997 and before 2002. On October 12, 2001, Minister of Finance Paul Martin announced a proposal to make permanent this special tax assistance for donations of publicly traded securities.

The denial of the foregoing beneficial treatment of gifts of publicly traded securities to donors who make gifts to a private foundation underscores the government’s apparent bias in favour of public charities.

Non-Qualifying Securities

There are other provisions that will adversely affect charitable donations and the ability to issue charitable receipts in certain non-arm’s-length situations. In essence, these anti-avoidance rules restrict the tax benefits available to donors who make gifts of certain types of assets to a private foundation.

Before these amendments, it was well known that the CCRA had, for some time, been unhappy with arrangements that allowed donors to make charitable gifts that permitted them to receive tax credits while at the same time retaining the effective use of the donated property. A typical example would be the situation where the owner of a business donated funds to a private foundation of which he and members of his family were directors. The foundation would subsequently lend the funds back to the business with some interest charge, or it would acquire shares of the business and ensure that there were sufficient funds available to the charity (by way of dividend payments) to satisfy the disbursement quota requirements. Often the corporate debtor would take out a life insurance policy on the life of the donor so that on the donor’s death, the insurance proceeds would be available to the corporation to repay the debt. Alternatively, the donor would gift a debt/note to the charity—that is, the shareholder who held a loan receivable from the company would gift it to the foundation.

This was the fact situation in the case of Re David Feldman Charitable Foundation. The issue in this case was the propriety of a loan made by the foundation to a corporation. It came up, not in the context of an income tax review, but rather on a passing of accounts of the foundation invoked by the Office of the Public Trustee of Ontario (now the PGT) under the Charities Accounting Act. One of the directors of the foundation was the principal shareholder of the debtor corporation. The loan was made at fair market rates, and the interest generated was used for charitable purposes. The court held that the directors of the foundation were in a conflict of interest in approving the loan and that the loan ought not to have been made, at least not without independent legal advice. The court also held that the foundation was a charitable trust and its directors were trustees, and that in authorizing the loan, the directors were in breach of trust. The court did
not order the directors to pay damages since the charity had not suffered any loss. However, it refused to pass and approve the accounts.

Although the Feldman case was not a tax case, the CCRA had expressed concerns about similar arrangements where private foundations lent money to corporations controlled by the donor. These concerns led to resolution 21 of the 1997 federal budget wherein proposals were made to eliminate the opportunity for loan-backs. In addition, that budget proposed to sharply curtail gifts of private company shares by introducing punitive measures. The draconian nature of these proposals was brought to the attention of the minister of finance, and a modified version was subsequently drafted and ultimately passed into law. While the revised legislation is a welcome relief from the original proposals, there are still problems and concerns.

The new provisions provided a mechanism for blocking gifts of private company shares and debt that fall into the category of “non-qualifying securities.” A “non-qualifying security” is defined in subsection 118.1(18) as follows:

(a) an obligation (other than an obligation of a financial institution to repay an amount deposited with the institution or an obligation listed on a prescribed stock exchange) of the individual or the individual’s estate or of any person or partnership with which the individual or the estate does not deal at arm’s length immediately after that time;

(b) a share (other than a share listed on a prescribed stock exchange) of the capital stock of a corporation with which the individual or the estate does not deal at arm’s length immediately after that time; or

(c) any other security (other than a security listed on a prescribed stock exchange) issued by the individual or the estate or by any person or partnership with which the individual or the estate does not deal at arm’s length immediately after that time.

Gifts of private company shares by an individual who controls the company are caught by the definition, as are gifts of debt by an individual when the debt is in respect of a non-arm’s-length corporation. Thus, for example, if a person lends money to a related company or person and donates that debt to a charity, the debt will be a non-qualifying security even if interest is charged on the debt. If the debt is a non-qualifying security, the rules will apply regardless of the intention of the donor. A third type of non-qualifying security is warrants or options, etc., gifted by an individual that do not qualify as shares or obligations issued by a corporation with which the individual does not deal at arm’s length.

Shares, obligations, and other securities listed on prescribed stock exchanges and amounts deposited with financial institutions are specifically excepted from the definition.

**Excepted Gifts**

There are certain gifts of shares that do not fall within the definition of a non-qualifying security. These are called “excepted gifts.” A gift that is an excepted gift will not be subject to the restrictive rules applicable to a non-qualifying security. Rather, tax relief will apply in the usual way.

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An “excepted gift” is a gift of shares made to a charity that is not a private foundation with the proviso that the donor deals at arm’s length with the donee charity and with each director, trustee, or officer of the donee charity. It should be noted that this saving provision applies only to shares that are not listed on a prescribed stock exchange. It does not apply to debt.

The arm’s-length requirement creates difficulties for potential donors of private company shares. Often, if a person is inclined to donate such shares, he or she will make the gift to a charitable organization or public foundation with which one or more members of the family are involved, usually at the board level. In this case, the gift will be considered a non-qualifying security. If such a gift were contemplated, perhaps the only way to avoid this characterization, and the consequent restriction of tax benefits, would be to have the related individuals resign from the board. Even so, it is not clear what the consequences might be if, after the gift was made, the related individuals returned to the board, or a related individual who was not previously a board member or officer was subsequently invited to join the organization.

Care must be taken to avoid turning an excepted gift into a non-qualifying security. This could occur if shares of a private family business corporation are gifted to a public foundation in circumstances where the corporation cannot distribute cash on the redemption of the gifted shares and chooses to satisfy the payment of proceeds of redemption by issuing a promissory note. That promissory note would be a non-qualifying security.

**Effect of Donating a Non-Qualifying Security**

If a donation of a non-qualifying security is made, the donor will be denied a tax credit for the donation in the year in which it is made. That is, the gift is ignored for the purpose of the charitable donation tax credit. However, if the non-arm’s-length connection between the donor and the issuer of the security is broken within the first 60 months or the recipient charity disposes of the security within 60 months of the time the donation was made, the gift will be deemed to have been made at the time the non-qualifying security is disposed of, or ceases to be non-qualifying. The charity can then issue a donation receipt for the gift. The fair market value of the donation will be deemed to be the lesser of

- the fair market value of the original gift as modified by any designation under subsection 118.1(6); and
- the value of the consideration received by the charity on the disposition of the non-qualifying security or, where the security ceases to be a non-qualifying security, the fair market value at that time.

For example, assume that Mr. X donates preference shares of a company controlled by him or by a person with whom he does not deal at arm’s length. The shares are redeemable for $3 million. These shares will be a non-qualifying security, and hence no charitable donation will be recognized in the year in which the
gift is made. However, if the company redeems the shares for their redemption amount within 60 months after the gift is made, Mr. X can claim a donation of $3 million in the year in which the shares are redeemed.26

Loanbacks

Subsections 118.1(16) and (17) introduce another set of anti-avoidance rules. These relate to what are called “loanback” situations and address circumstances with which the government has long been unhappy. One of these situations is described in the Feldman case, discussed above. Another is illustrated by the 1999 tax case Jabs Construction Limited v. The Queen.27

In Jabs Construction, the facts, briefly,28 were as follows. The corporate taxpayer had made a gift to a private foundation, which then loaned the funds back to the donor corporation. In the process, tax on a capital gain was eliminated. The transaction was challenged by the CCRA on the basis that it offended the general anti-avoidance rule (section 245 of the Act). The court held, however, that it could not see how “the use of a specific provision of the Act that allows the tax consequences of a charitable gift to be mitigated can by any stretch of the imagination be a misuse of the provisions of the Act or an abuse within the meaning of subsection 245(4).”29 The government’s response to this decision was to enact subsections 118.1(16) and (17). These will apply to two types of situations.

The first situation is addressed by subparagraph 118.1(16)(c)(i). This provision applies where an individual has made a gift of property to a charity other than a non-qualifying security and, within five years of the time the gift is made, the charity acquires and holds a non-qualifying security of the individual. In such a case, subsection 118.1(16) applies to deny a tax credit in respect of the first donation.30

For example, assume that an individual makes a $1,000 cash gift to a charity, and two years later the charity lends $1,000 to a corporation that does not deal at arm’s length with the individual. Alternatively, a charity lends $1,000 to a corporation and within five years thereafter an individual who does not deal at arm’s length with the corporation makes a $1,000 gift to that charity. In both cases, the charitable receipt will be reduced by $1,000.

The second situation is addressed by subparagraph 118.1(16)(c)(ii). In this case, a gift of property other than a non-qualifying security is made to a charity by a donor who does not deal at arm’s length with the charity and who subsequently uses the property within five years of making the gift. If the donor’s use of the property was pursuant to an agreement made or modified no earlier than five years before the gift was made, and the use of the property was not in the course of the charity’s charitable activities, again subsection 118.1(16) will apply to deny a tax credit to the donor.

An example of this type of loanback would be a situation in which Ms X makes a gift of a valuable painting to her private foundation and reaches an agreement with the directors of the foundation to keep the painting at her house.
Another example would be a situation where Ms X makes a gift of real property to a charity and she or a person who does not deal at arm’s length with her uses the property, even if she or he pays for such use. In both cases, Ms X will be deemed to have disposed of the property but will not be considered to have made a charitable donation.

There does not appear to be any subsequent recognition of the gift if the loaned funds or the “used” property is returned to the charity.

Subsection 118.1(17) is an ordering rule that operates to determine the order of the reduction in tax credits where subsection 118.1(16) applies. The technical notes to subsection 118.1(17) indicate that ordering is done on a “first in, first out” basis and give the following example: if, in each of years 1 to 3 a donor makes a gift of $100 and in year 4 the donee acquires a non-qualifying security of the donor for $130, subsections 118.1(16) and (17) will be triggered to eliminate the gift in year 1 and reduce the gift in year 2 to $70.

**Non-Qualified Investments and Section 189**

In addition to these new rules, the provisions of section 189 continue to apply. Under certain circumstances, these rules impose a penalty tax on issuers of non-qualified investments held by a private foundation. A non-qualified investment is defined in subsection 149.1(1) and can include a debt, a share, or a right to acquire a share.

In the case of a debt, the debt must be owing to the private foundation by

- a person who is a member, shareholder, trustee, settlor, officer, official, or director of the foundation; or
- a person who either alone, or as a member of a group of persons who do not deal with each other at arm’s length, has contributed more than 50 percent of the capital to the foundation; or
- a person who does not deal at arm’s length with any such person.

In the case of a corporation, a debt will be a non-qualified investment if the corporation is controlled by the foundation, by any person or group of persons described above, by the foundation and any other private foundation with which it does not deal at arm’s length, or by any combination of these persons.

A non-qualified share investment will include a share in the capital stock of a corporation referred to above, held by the foundation, or held by persons not dealing at arm’s length with the foundation. Shares listed on a prescribed stock exchange either within or outside Canada will not be included.

Rights to acquire shares that are non-qualified investments are also themselves a non-qualified investment.

If a non-qualified investment does not achieve a required minimum rate of return, a penalty tax will be imposed on the issuer of the investment for the period during which it is held, and the amount that will be payable is equal to the
difference between the interest or dividends that should have been paid on the investment during the period and the amount of interest or dividends that was actually paid by the debtor or the corporation during the year or within 30 days of the year-end. Thus, as long as prescribed market rate interest or dividends are paid to the foundation, no penalty tax will be imposed.

It is clear from all of the foregoing that the recent changes to the Act may adversely affect gifts to private foundations. Donors who wish to make gifts of publicly traded shares will receive additional benefits from making such gifts to public foundations rather than private foundations in that they can then access the additional benefit of a reduction in the amount of capital gain that must be included in income. Donors wishing to gift private company shares (but not debt or other gifts that fall within the definition of “non-qualifying security”) will be able to make such gifts only to public foundations or charitable organizations in order to benefit from the “excepted gift” provision.

Given the consequences of the new rules for gifts to private foundations, taxpayers have looked to alternative entities as possible recipients of their charitable donations. Of particular interest are community foundations, a type of public foundation that offers several of the advantages of private foundations without compromising the desired tax benefits. These entities are the focus of the discussion that follows.

COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS
Advantages of Donations to a Community Foundation

As discussed above, public foundations are those registered charities that do not apply all of their resources directly in carrying out charitable activities (and thus are distinguished from charitable organizations), and have arm’s-length relationships with their donors and arm’s-length relationships among a majority of board members or trustees (and thus are not categorized as private foundations). Public foundations exist in a variety of forms. For example, the so-called parallel foundation is established to act as a fund-raising and fund-administering entity for a particular operating charity, such as a hospital or art gallery. Other public foundations have a much broader focus, in many cases acting as a sort of umbrella organization for numerous operating charities on a national or an international scale. Between these extremes lie community foundations, which, as the name suggests, seek to support charitable works in a particular municipality or region. A community foundation has a somewhat broader focus than a parallel foundation, but nevertheless maintains a direct link to people and programs in the local community.

While Canada’s first community foundation was established in Winnipeg in 1921, it is only in the past 10 years or so that these entities have established a strong presence in Canada. In 1990, when a national organization, Community Foundations of Canada (CFC), was formed, there were about 30 community foundations across the country. Today there are more than 100; 14 new community
foundations joined CFC in 2000 alone. According to CFC’s 2000 annual report, currently its members collectively administer more than $1.4 billion in assets.

It appears that much of this growth may be attributed to the tax amendments reviewed above and what has been characterized as the CCRA’s “discriminatory” treatment of private foundations. Statistics provided by CFC indicate that in 2000, community foundations received approximately $185 million in donations, more than 60 percent of which were in the form of securities. It may be that, given the disincentives to establish a private foundation, some donors who might otherwise consider this option are turning to community foundations with a view to obtaining similar benefits.

The advantages of giving to a community foundation have been summarized as follows:

If a donor feels that he or she does not have sufficient funds to establish a private foundation, consideration might be given to gifting the amount to one of the well-run community foundations which will administer the funds for you. Fairly specific and detailed directions may be given to the community foundation on how you wish the income from the fund dispensed to charity. It is also possible to have the donor’s name attached to that specific fund in perpetuity.

Community foundations offer flexibility to the donor. At the time of creating the fund within the foundation, donors can name the fund, the purpose of the fund, and even the charity to be supported. Donors can designate that their gift be held in perpetuity with distribution to be made only from income; they can designate that distribution be made of principal as well as income, over a certain number of years; or they can work out any combination they want. No other philanthropic mechanism has the same flexibility.

A donor wishing to create a fund has simply to instruct the community foundation in writing as to the name of the fund and what he or she wants done with the income from the fund, and subject to this being accepted by the Board of Directors of the foundation, and on receipt of the gift, these wishes will be carried out.

The donor’s fund is named in annual reports and other publications of the community foundation and thus receives recognition in perpetuity.

This passage was written more than 10 years ago. As the introductory language suggests, at that time, gifts to community foundations represented an attractive alternative principally to those donors with insufficient funds to justify the establishment of a private foundation. With the recent tax amendments, however, even those donors who might otherwise have chosen to create a private foundation have shown increased interest in community foundations.

The features of a private foundation that may make it attractive to a donor have already been explained. As the above extract indicates, many of these advantages can also be enjoyed through a “donor-advised fund” under the control of a community foundation. For example, achieving public recognition of the donor’s gift will usually be possible. In most cases, the community foundation will allow the donor to establish a permanent endowment fund bearing the name of the
donor or of another person or persons designated by the donor. This name will continue to be associated with the fund as distributions are periodically made from income or capital.34

On the other hand, some of the other benefits that a private foundation may offer are absent in the case of a community foundation. For example, the personal satisfaction of operating a charity and the opportunity to instill charitable values in family members are for the most part lost when administration is relinquished to the community foundation. Similarly, the ability to protect the donor’s privacy and confidentiality regarding the details of the gift are compromised. As well, the community foundation offers fewer advantages of timing and scheduling. While a gift to a private foundation can be made immediately and the eventual charitable use of the gift can be left to be determined at some future time, any directions and conditions imposed upon a gift to a community foundation must be determined and documented at the time the gift is made.

At the same time, the community foundation offers clear advantages to donors in the form of simplicity, administrative ease, and cost. The establishment and operation of a private foundation invariably involves legal and accounting costs that will, to a greater or lesser degree, reduce the funds available for charitable work. When a gift is made to a community foundation, the costs involved in establishing the donor’s fund will largely be borne by the receiving foundation. With respect to ongoing administration costs, because these tend to be spread over all the funds managed by the foundation’s fund administrator, generally costs for each fund are significantly lower than they would be in the case of a gift to a private foundation. Simply put, community foundations tend to benefit from certain economies of scale.

A donor-advised or donor-directed gift to a community foundation may best fulfill the donor’s objectives where there is some doubt that the donor’s zeal and vision will be sustained by subsequent generations. If the donor perceives that his or her family lacks the enthusiasm to take on the challenge of administering a private foundation, it may be preferable to establish a directed fund within a community foundation at the outset. Alternatively, if the original donor does not initially opt for a private foundation, members of the subsequent generation may find that turning the fund over to a community foundation is the best way to fulfill the charitable objectives of their ancestor.

This leaves for consideration the most significant issue of all: donor control. It must be asked whether in this most crucial of areas, the community foundation can approximate the benefits of a private foundation. It is also necessary to consider the extent to which community foundations may promise benefits in this regard that they may not be able to deliver. In order to appear as an attractive alternative to private foundations, community foundations offer to administer “donor-advised funds,” agreeing to receive such gifts and promising to thereafter administer and distribute the assets in accordance with the donor’s advice or direction. This is done under some form of “deed of gift,” “memorandum of gift,” “donor agreement,” or similar document setting out the parties’ rights and structuring their relationship

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on a prospective basis. To reserve to the donor the right to control the assets after their transfer to the foundation, such agreements may provide for obligations to consult with the donor (or members of the donor’s family, or other designated advisers) regarding investment and/or disposition decisions. They may go further, obligating the foundation not merely to consult, but to obtain the donor’s approval. Such agreements present two potential problems. First, ambiguously drafted restrictions may have an uncertain legal status, potentially exposing the foundation or its board members to liability. Second, excessively stringent restrictions on the foundation’s freedom to deal with the assets may deprive the transfer of its character as a “gift” for income tax purposes.

**Donor-Advised or Restricted Funds**

As a result of the risk that a narrowly restricted gift will be found to be no gift at all, the tendency in donor agreements is to cast donor restrictions in weaker terms, providing, for example, that while the donor will be consulted, ultimate authority over investment and disposition decisions lies with the foundation. There is an obvious tension in drafting these agreements. On the one hand, there is the need to preserve the foundation’s flexibility and to ensure a gift characterization, and therefore any restrictions must appear to have limited force. On the other hand, there is the need to satisfy the donor that the restrictions are binding upon the foundation. Of course, such agreements function satisfactorily so long as the donor and the foundation are able to reach a consensus on necessary administrative decisions. However, insufficient consideration appears to have been given by both donors and charities to the question of the parties’ respective rights in the event of disagreement.

To some degree, this issue has been highlighted by the recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Re Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada*. The case concerned the exigibility of a corporate charity’s assets to satisfy tort claims arising out of the charity’s work. In reaching a decision, the court was required to examine the ways in which such a charity holds its assets. Blair J of the General Division affirmed that a charity’s property is presumptively not trust property:

A charitable corporation does not hold its assets “as trustee” for charitable purposes. It holds its assets beneficially, like any other corporation. As a matter of corporate law, of course, it must use those assets in a manner consistent with its corporate objects, and its directors have fiduciary obligations to ensure that such is the case. Where its corporate objects and its charitable purposes coincide—as they do in this case—it must use its assets in a manner consistent with those charitable purposes. Nevertheless, this does not mean that it holds all of its assets in some kind of trust capacity.

The law in this jurisdiction does not support the proposition that all assets received by a charitable corporation such as The Christian Brothers of Ireland in Canada by way of a gift or bequest are presumptively received in trust, and held by the corporation “as trustee” for the charitable purposes of the corporation, as
opposed to being held beneficially by the corporation and required by its objects to be used for such purposes.  

Blair J did, however, go on to find that notwithstanding the fact that a charity’s assets were generally held absolutely and beneficially, it was possible for a charitable corporation to receive property subject to express trust obligations. As with any other trust, this required the “three certainties”: certainty with respect to the settlor’s intention to create a trust; certainty as to the subject matter or property being settled on trust; and certainty of the beneficiaries or objects. Where these requirements were satisfied, the assets received would be regarded as being held upon “specific charitable purpose trusts,” to distinguish them from assets that, being held beneficially, could be applied to any of the charity’s general charitable purposes.

Blair J also considered an intermediate category of charitable assets: those that were given without true trust obligations but had been “earmarked” by donors for some particular charitable purpose. The court found that such earmarking or informal expression of a donor’s wishes or intentions did no more than create a “precatory trust”:

A “precatory trust” is not a trust at all. Where the donor gives or bequeaths the property to the charitable corporation absolutely and merely imposes some sort of moral obligation on the corporation to use the property in a certain way—using words of expectation or desire or purpose, but not words indicating that the donee is not to take the property beneficially but only for the objects or purposes described—no charitable purpose trust is established. The charitable corporation takes the gift or bequest and holds it—and any property derived from it—for the general charitable purposes and objects of the corporation. . . .

Property emanating from contributions made through general fundraising campaigns, or even through fundraising campaigns for particular projects, . . . might fall into this category.

As regards the exigibility of a charitable corporation’s assets to satisfy tort claims, Blair J applied well-established principles of trust law. Assets held beneficially for the corporation’s general charitable purposes were available to tort claimants because “compensation for such wrongs is caught within the rubric of the furtherance of those charitable purposes.” Exigibility was narrower in respect of assets held on “special charitable purpose trusts.” Where the charitable corporation held assets in its capacity as a trustee, those assets were not available to its creditors (including tort claimants) generally, but would be available only to satisfy claims arising out of charitable activities related to that particular purpose.

On appeal, Feldman JA rejected even this narrowly circumscribed form of charitable immunity, holding that all of a corporate charity’s assets were available to satisfy tort claims. However, the reasoning by which the judge reached this conclusion creates a number of uncertainties in this area of the law.

For the most part, Feldman JA appears to have accepted Blair J’s classification of charitable assets. In summarizing the decision at first instance, she wrote:
Blair J stated as a general principle that a charitable corporation does not hold its assets as trustee for its charitable purposes but rather holds them beneficially as does any other corporation.

A precatory trust is not a true trust, but rather an expression of the desire of the donor to have the funds used for a specific purpose without the creation of a true trust for the purpose. That desire is not binding on the corporation and such funds are beneficially owned by the corporation and not shielded from execution. Blair J included in this category funds raised through general fundraising campaigns or even campaigns for a particular project of the corporation.

This is to be distinguished from the case where the three certainties of a trust are present: certainty of intention, certainty of subject-matter and certainty of objects (in this case charitable purposes) so that a charitable purpose trust is created.

There is no suggestion in her reasons that Feldman JA took issue with any of these propositions. Indeed, the judge expressly agreed that, while a corporate charity presumptively holds its assets beneficially, it could act as a trustee:

The authors of Tudor on Charities, 8th ed. (1995), p. 159, have extrapolated . . . the proposition that a charitable company may hold particular property on trust for specific charitable purposes, distinct from its other property, and that “clearly to misapply such property would be a breach of trust.” I agree with the authors of Tudor on Charities as to the obligations of the charity when it accepts such a gift, but with the following qualifications: (a) as long as the charity is in operation, and (b) subject to any cy-près order of the court, the charity would be obliged to use the funds for the purpose stipulated by the trust.

Feldman JA does not adequately explain why such trust obligations disappear upon the charity’s ceasing to operate; clearly, the insolvency or winding up of a non-charitable trustee does not have this effect. Furthermore, the subsequent portion of Feldman JA’s decision suggests that the satisfaction of tort claims allows for recourse to all assets held on trust even where the charity’s operations are not being wound up. This is the troubling inconsistency in the judgment: on the one hand, it recognizes that a charitable corporation may hold particular assets subject to trust obligations; on the other hand, those trust obligations appear not to produce the legal consequences normally following from legal, but not beneficial, ownership.

Fortunately, it does not appear necessary to resolve these difficulties in Feldman JA’s judgment for the purposes of the present discussion. Both Blair J and Feldman JA appear to have been of the view that a charitable corporation may receive donations either beneficially or upon a special charitable purpose trust, and that a sharp distinction is to be drawn between these categories. In other words, there was agreement with respect to the limited legal significance of donor-expressed intentions and wishes where these fall short of imposing clear trust obligations.

This holding is of critical importance in circumstances where a community foundation is required to make an investment or disposition decision and the foundation and the donor are unable to reach a consensus on the preferable course of
The determination of whether the donor’s recommendation must be implemented or whether the foundation’s board is ultimately free to do what it regards as being in the best interests of the foundation turns on whether the donor’s gift was subject to true trust obligations; that is, whether the donor agreement establishes a “special charitable purpose trust.” Donor agreements that blur this distinction create significant liability risks for the foundation.

Take, for example, a scenario in which Mr. X makes a donation to a community foundation under the terms of an agreement indicating that the foundation will give effect to Mr. X’s distribution recommendations. If, in the future, the foundation were to disregard such wishes and recommendations with respect to a particular distribution, a court might find it to be in breach of trust on the basis that the donor agreement evidenced a trust requiring distribution decisions to be made on the basis of a consensus between Mr. X and the foundation. On the other hand, if the terms of the agreement are construed as merely precatory, not imposing binding obligations, and the foundation gives undue weight to Mr. X’s recommendations or directions, the foundation’s board of directors may be held liable for any loss sustained on the grounds that deferring to Mr. X’s wishes represents an improper delegation or abdication of the directors’ duties as trustees and fiduciaries.

Similar problems can arise with restrictions giving (or purporting to give) the donor the right to direct the manner in which the transferred assets will be invested. Consider, for example, a situation in which a community foundation accepts a gift subject to a donor stipulation that the moneys granted remain invested in a particular stock, and that stock subsequently begins to decline in value. If the stipulation is merely precatory, the first obligation of the foundation’s board is to dispose of the stock so as to preserve the corporation’s capital and protect its charitable purposes. The failure to do so would likely be regarded as a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the corporation, as well as a breach of the trust obligations owed by virtue of their deemed trustee status under the Charities Accounting Act. On the other hand, if the donor has settled the funds on an express trust, pursuant to which the foundation, as trustee, has investment powers limited to investing in the specified stock, the first obligation is to retain that stock. While that investment, viewed objectively, may be imprudent, a trustee in the foundation’s position would be powerless to dispose of it; to do so would be a clear breach of trust.

“Gifts” and Retention of Control

In light of the foregoing, it must be concluded that donor control can be assured only where the foundation assumes true trust obligations. It then becomes necessary to consider whether such restrictions deprive the donation of its voluntary and gratuitous nature, such that it is no longer a “gift” for which a charitable receipt may be issued.

The term “gift” is not defined in the Act. It may reasonably be asked whether a charity can be said to receive a gift if it acquires only the legal interest in property
as a trustee and not the beneficial interest. The CCRA’s information circulars and interpretation bulletins also fail to provide a complete answer to this question. Interpretation Bulletin IT-110R3 does make clear that certain donor restrictions will make the gift ineligible for an official receipt:

A charity may not issue an official receipt for income tax purposes if the donor has directed the charity to give the funds to a specified person or family. In reality, such a gift is made to the person or family and not to the charity. However, donations subject to a general direction from the donor that the gift be used in a particular program operated by the charity are acceptable, provided that no benefit accrues to the donor, the directed gift does not benefit any person not dealing at arm’s length with the donor, and decisions regarding utilization of the donation within a program rest with the charity.46

What is the effect, however, where the donor has given more than a “general direction” as to the use of funds, and decisions with respect thereto do not entirely “rest with the charity” because of the trust constraints imposed by the donor? Arguably, these conditions would exceed the degree of limitation regarded as permissible under IT-110R3, and thus the donation would not qualify as a gift for which a receipt may be issued.

The better view, however, is that a donation made subject to trust restrictions consistent with a charity’s objects—thereby establishing a “special charitable purpose trust,” in the language of the Christian Brothers decision—is as much a gift for the purposes of the Act as an unrestricted gift. The extract from IT-110R3 quoted above clearly indicates a concern that donor restrictions not enure to the benefit of the donor or others with whom the donor does not deal at arm’s length. In other words, the concern is with a sham gift that is merely channelled through a charity.47 Understandably, such a gift is not regarded as a gift to the charitable organization, or given in support of its charitable purposes, and thus it does not justify a deduction from taxable income. On the other hand, the quoted extract clearly authorizes donor directions that restrict the application of funds to a particular program within the charity’s broader charitable objects. There appears to be no reason why the mere fact that this direction or restriction is in law a trust obligation should render the donation ineligible as a “gift.”

Moreover, this view is supported by the previous case law in which the meaning of the term “gift” in the Act has been considered. The concern is consistently whether the donor has parted with property without the receipt, or the promise of future receipt, of compensation.48 While a disposition by way of trust rather than gift may have consequences for the donee, from the perspective of the donor the disposition is absolute and gratuitous. Thus, it is appropriate to regard property transferred to a charity under a trust as a disposition that entitles the donor to deduct the value of that property from his or her taxable income.49

In one specific context, the Act is explicit in stating that a donation to a charity may be a “charitable gift” notwithstanding that it is subject to trust obligations.
The “disbursement quota” defined and quantified in subsection 149.1(1) is calculated on the basis of 80 percent of the amounts for which a charity has issued official receipts other than, inter alia,

a gift received subject to a trust or direction to the effect that the property given, or property substituted therefor, is to be held by the foundation for a period of not less than 10 years.

Thus, the Act expressly contemplates that an official receipt may be given for a gift subject to trust obligations. It appears that, so long as those trust obligations do not benefit the donor or persons with whom the donor does not deal at arm’s length, a trust donation to a charity is as much a “charitable gift” as is an absolute donation.50

Several CCRA advance rulings have also recognized that where a donor imposes conditions on the transfer of assets, this does not, in itself, deprive the transfer of its character as a gift. For example, the CCRA has stated:

Where the donor and a charity enter into an agreement that the charity will use the donated property in a manner which is consistent with the ordinary objects and operations of the charity, and which does not result in any benefit accruing to the donor or a person not at arm’s length with the donor, our view would be that the gift would not be tainted by the general direction.51

Similarly, the CCRA has ruled that the recognition and use of a donor’s name will not taint the gift. In one instance, the reason for providing the favourable ruling was stated as follows:

In previous files, we concluded that the fact that there are conditions attached to a gift does not, in itself, negate the gift (jurisprudence does not provide that conditions negate a gift). As with the other files, the donor in this case is freely parting with the funds or property, receives no benefit, other than recognition, in return and the funds or property can never revert to the donor or any related person.52

Thus, it is not restrictions imposed upon the donee, but rather only benefits to the donor, that will deprive a disposition of its characterization as a gift. Furthermore, incidental benefits such as favourable tax treatment or recognition of the donor’s philanthropy are not regarded as benefits that deprive the gift of its voluntary and uncompensated character. Nevertheless, excessive donor control after disposition and significant limitations on the donee’s freedom to deal with the property may lead to the conclusion that no gift has been made. An illustration of a degree of donor control that exceeds the permissible limits is offered by the US Tax Court decision in *The Fund for Anonymous Gifts v. IRS*.53 The plaintiff Fund for Anonymous Gifts (“the fund”) sought a declaration that it was a charitable organization entitled to tax-exempt status. The fund enabled benefactors to make donations, thereby entitling them to an immediate tax deduction, while continuing

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to control the investment of the funds donated and ultimately to direct distributions to operating charities. The trustee of the fund was compelled to implement the donors’ directions because the gifts were made subject to enforceable conditions subsequent. The trustee was bound to comply with the conditions so long as such compliance did not require the trustee to violate Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulations, as would, for example, a direction to make a distribution to a non-charitable recipient. In the material part of its analysis, the court stated:

The manner in which the Fund’s investment activity would be conducted makes clear that one of the purposes of the Fund is to allow persons to take a charitable deduction for a donation to the Fund while retaining investment control over the donation. This is so because the Trustee is bound by the conditions attached to the donations as to the “terms or conditions for retaining such transfers,” to the “use or disposition of the transferred property,” and to the “acts required of the Trustee in the management of such property, or the disposition of income from assets attributable to such transfers,” unless any of these conditions require that the Trustee make a donation to a non-exempt organization or to an individual for a noncharitable use. Therefore, other than this exception, the Trustee is fully bound by the investment instructions attached to the donation. The investment activity therefore allows the donor to control the investment, to make a risk-free investment, and to take a charitable deduction for his donation.

Such risk-free investment activity is clearly not an exempt purpose. Although the income made by the investment will be donated to a charitable purpose, this activity benefits the donor because the donor controls the investment. The purpose, therefore, of this potentially money-making activity is not to make charitable contributions but to allow the donor to control the investment. If the true purpose of the Fund is to make anonymous charitable donations with the income resulting from these investments, it is unclear to the Court why the Fund is specifically organized to allow the donor to have full control over investment decisions. In addition, under this scheme, the donor receives the Trustee’s investment services for free. It is the ultimate recipient who pays for the Trustee’s investment services because under the Agreement, the fee is deducted from the donation.54

Therefore, although the donor did not retain legal or beneficial ownership of the funds donated, and did not receive the income generated by the investment of those funds while under administration by the fund, the court held that such donations were not charitable gifts.55 Of course, to some degree this result is a function of aspects of the US taxation regime that differ somewhat from Canada’s tax laws. Indeed, the court’s holding was not that the donors had not made gifts, but that these were not charitable gifts because the fund was not a charity. Nevertheless, the decision is an indication of how courts may be inclined to treat charitable gifts to public foundations that, through the mechanisms of a trust or conditional gift, attempt to reserve to the donor many of the benefits that would otherwise be available only through the use of a private foundation.56
CONCLUSION

It appears that a donor can approximate the type of control offered by a private foundation by making a gift to a community foundation, subject to donor restrictions that constitute true trust obligations. Absent trust obligations, the donor restrictions are somewhat illusory: those restrictions will (and, indeed, can) be given effect only so long as the donor’s advice and recommendations are in accordance with the decisions that the board of directors regards as being in the foundation’s best interests. However, while a trust may satisfy the donor’s objectives in this regard, such a gift may be much less attractive from the foundation’s perspective. Clearly, the assumption of trust obligations in respect of discrete donor-advised funds adds to the foundation’s administrative burdens. Furthermore, board members are understandably reluctant to assume the obligations of trustees when these may come into conflict with their fiduciary obligations in respect of the assets the foundation holds absolutely. Finally, there are unsettled issues regarding the interplay between the administration of trust assets and beneficially held assets. For example, if a donor directs that his or her segregated fund be invested in speculative stock, should the foundation seek to achieve a balanced portfolio by investing its own (that is, non-trust) assets in bonds and similar low-risk securities? Beyond these additional burdens that “special purpose charitable trusts” would impose upon the community foundation, there remains the outstanding question of when excessively stringent trust terms—particularly where these “benefit” the donor by reserving some measure of control—will disqualify the donation from recognition as a charitable gift.

For all of these reasons, the practice of community foundations has been to solicit and establish donor-advised funds on terms that do not create trust obligations. This is achieved by drafting donor agreements that include provisions clarifying that the assets transferred will be held in the foundation’s “normal corporate capacity”; provisions expressly stating that the agreement is not intended to create trust obligations; and provisions making it clear that while the donor may make recommendations, final decision-making authority rests with the foundation. This is clearly the preferable practice; for the reasons discussed above, it is not prudent to use ambiguous donor agreements whereby the foundation assumes control while purporting to grant that control to the donor.

While an unambiguously drafted donor agreement will clarify a foundation’s legal obligations, such an agreement will also highlight the donor’s relinquishment of control. For donors for whom the retention of control is important, it will be equally apparent that a donor-advised fund administered by a community foundation is not, in all respects, a substitute for a private foundation. It is clear from the growing use of donor-advised funds that, for many donors, this is not a problem. While some donors seek a continuing role in the charitable distributions made from the assets gifted to the community foundation—and, to a lesser degree, in the investment of those assets pending distribution—others are satisfied with an advisory or consultative role. Many individuals will gladly relinquish absolute control so as to be relieved of the administrative costs and burdens. For such
donors, a donor-advised fund in a community foundation is an attractive alternative to the establishment of a private foundation. There will, however, remain a class of donors for whom the advantages of a private foundation cannot be approximated by a donor-advised fund.

It is clear that there are numerous motivations and considerations behind each donor’s decision to make a substantial charitable gift. The way in which these various factors are weighted and prioritized is likely to determine the donor’s choice of the preferable vehicle for charitable giving. For donors whose primary concern is the ability to remain directly involved in the administration and disbursement of assets after making a gift, the private foundation may still be the most attractive option. On the other hand, the Act imposes significant restrictions and limitations on gifts to private foundations, and these constraints will discourage many donors from employing such a vehicle.

For donors who are prepared to relinquish ultimate control over assets donated to charity, the community foundation may be an attractive alternative. Through the establishment of a donor-advised or donor-directed fund, the donor can continue to play an active role in the administration and application of the assets donated without facing many of the restrictions imposed on private foundations. Among the principal tax benefits of giving to a community foundation (that is, a public foundation under the Act) are the increased inclusion rate for capital gains on publicly traded shares, and the community foundation’s ability to issue charitable receipts for gifts of private company shares as “excepted gifts.” As discussed above, the donor also realizes non-tax benefits in the area of administrative ease and convenience. Where establishing a private foundation may impose significant demands on the donor’s time and attention, a community foundation will administer the funds, keep the requisite records, issue receipts, and deal with other potentially time-consuming matters of administration.

While there is a compromise in the area of control, the donor-advised or donor-directed fund within a community foundation is likely to appeal to many donors. It is a means by which the donor (or persons designated by the donor) may remain involved in investment and/or disbursement decisions, without assuming the administrative burdens of establishing a private foundation and without attracting certain disadvantageous tax treatment. Even where the community foundation’s donor agreement makes it clear that ultimate decision-making authority rests with the foundation, many donors are likely to be satisfied with such a consultative or advisory role. Within these limits, the donor-advised fund with a community foundation may be an attractive alternative to a private foundation.

Notes

1 Voluntary Sector Roundtable, Panel on Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector, *Building on Strength: Improving Governance and Accountability in Canada’s Voluntary Sector* (Ottawa: Voluntary Sector Roundtable, February 1999), 13. The report does not provide any additional information on either the time period covered by these data or the source from which they were obtained.
2 RSC 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), as amended (herein referred to as “the Act”). Unless otherwise stated, statutory references in this article are to the Act.


4 Subsection 149.1(1), definitions of “charity,” “public foundation,” and “private foundation.”

5 Ibid., definition of “charitable organization.”

6 Ibid., definition of “charitable foundation.”

7 Ibid., definition of “public foundation.”

8 Ibid., definition of “private foundation.”

9 See, for example, James M. Park, “New Developments and Challenges with CCRA,” Canadian Bar Association—Ontario, Continuing Legal Education, October 27, 2000, 5.

10 In addition, as will be discussed later in this article, the Act imposes certain restrictions on gifts of private company shares to public foundations.

11 Regulation 3500.

12 See Re David Feldman Charitable Foundation (1987), 58 OR (2d) 626 (Surr. Ct.), for an example of the exercise of this jurisdiction.

13 RSO 1990, c. C.10, as amended.


15 In addition, subsection 149.1(4) of the Income Tax Act provides that the registration of a private foundation can be revoked if the foundation acquires control of a corporation.

16 Under section 110.1, corporations are entitled to a deduction.

17 Subsection 118.1(1).

18 Issues have arisen with respect to gifts by will. These include the following:

1) If there is a supervening life interest, can a charitable credit be claimed in the year of death? Yes, says the CCRA, so long as there is no ability to encroach on capital before the gift vests in the charity. See O’Brien v. MNR, 91 DTC 1349 (TCC); and CCRA document no. 9732295, March 20, 1998.

2) Where the trustees have the discretion as to the timing of the charitable gifts, or the particular charity or charities to be benefited, or the amounts of the gifts, the CCRA initially took the position that the charitable credit cannot be claimed in the year of death because it is not a gift by will. See CCRA document no. 9732295, March 20, 1998; CCRA document no. 9730365, February 25, 1998; Interpretation Bulletin IT-226R, November 29, 1991, paragraphs 3 and 6; and CCRA document no. 9730875, February 17, 1998. A change from this position is found in CCRA document no. 2000-0055825, March 8, 2001. In that document, the CCRA states that where a will stipulates that a specific amount is to be gifted to charity and provides a list of charities to which donations should be made but discretion is left to the executor to determine the amount to be given to each named charity, the donation will qualify as a gift by will if the actions taken by the executor are reasonable and in accordance with the terms of the will and the donation is made to a charity that is a qualified donee.

3) Where a testamentary gift is made to a foundation to be established after the death of the testator, the CCRA initially indicated that there may be difficulties in claiming a charitable credit in the year of death since the charity is not then in existence. See “Table ronde sur la fiscalité fédérale,” in Congrès 99 (Montréal: Association planification fiscale et financière, 1999), question 11. Again, however, the CCRA has since changed its position. Now the fact that the foundation did not exist at the time of the individual’s death will not, in and of itself,
preclude the donation from otherwise qualifying as a gift by will so long as the foundation is a qualified donee at the time the gift is actually made. See CCRA document nos. 2000-0055825, supra, and 2000-0005187, March 6, 2001. The CCRA also notes in the latter document that the completion of the gift should occur within a reasonable period after the date of death. If the gift to the foundation occurs after the assessment of the deceased’s final tax return, the tax return may be reassessed, subject to the time limitations in the Act for reassessments, to allow a charitable tax credit for the gift to the extent that it is supported by an official tax receipt.

19 Supra note 12.
20 Supra note 13.
22 Subsection 118.1(19). See also comments by Arthur B.C. Drache in (January 1988), vol. 6, no. 1 Canadian Not-for-Profit News 1-2.
23 Paragraph 118.1(13)(a).
24 Paragraphs 118.1(13)(b) and (c). Subsection 118.1(14) provides that if a donee receives a new share in the course of certain corporate reorganizations in exchange for a share that was a non-qualifying security of the donor, the new share will be deemed to be the same share as the original share. Thus, if the new share is disposed of within 60 months after the donation of the original share, the individual will be deemed to have made a charitable gift under subsection 118.1(13).
25 Paragraphs 118.1(13)(b) and (c).
26 A number of questions arise with respect to the meaning of some key words in the definition of “non-qualifying security.” These are “does not deal at arm’s length” and “immediately after that time.” Interpretation Bulletin IT-419R, August 24, 1995, discusses some of the criteria used to determine whether persons deal with each other at arm’s length under the Act. See also section 251 of the Act. These sources indicate that an individual will not be at arm’s length from a corporation where the corporation is controlled by the individual, a person related to the individual, a related group of which at least one person is related to the individual, or a trust in which the individual is beneficially interested. With respect to an estate, it would not be at arm’s length with the corporation if the corporation was controlled by the estate, a person or persons beneficially interested in the estate (and thus not at arm’s length with the estate), or a person or persons not at arm’s length with a person beneficially interested in the estate. The following example highlights potential problems that can arise where a charitable gift is made by will. In this regard, it should be recalled that a gift in a will is deemed to have been made by the deceased person in the year of death.

Assume that Mr. X owns preference and common shares of a corporation. In his will, he bequeaths the preference shares to charity and the common shares to his children. Is the gift of the preference shares a non-qualifying security such that the gift will initially be denied? If Mr. X is the “individual who makes the gift,” who is the “individual” who is not at arm’s length with Mr. X “immediately after that time”? Is it Mr. X’s estate or his personal representatives? The Tax Policy branch of the Department of Finance has confirmed orally that Mr. X is the “individual” for these purposes and that, following his death, the “individual” is the personal representative of Mr. X. However, at what stage in the administration of the estate can it be said that there is no longer a non-arm’s-length relationship? What is the situation when the estate trustees distribute the shares to the children and wind up the administration of the estate? In what circumstances might the trustees be able to take the position that the estate has begun to deal at arm’s length with the issuer of the preferred shares even though the children are the prime beneficiaries of the estate?

27 99 DTC 729 (TCC).
For the interested reader, the following summary provides a more detailed account of the transactions involved:

- Pursuant to a settlement agreement between Jabs Construction Limited ("Jabs") and Callahan Construction Company Limited ("Callahan"), Jabs agreed to sell its 50 percent interest in 13 properties ("the properties") to Callahan. The properties were encumbered by mortgages totalling $4,833,709.
- Rather than sell the properties directly to Callahan, Jabs gifted them to the Felsen Foundation ("the foundation"). The controlling shareholder of Jabs was a director of the foundation. The remaining directors of the foundation were the controlling shareholder’s wife and adult children.
- Immediately before gifting the properties to the foundation, Jabs borrowed approximately $3,293,000 from the foundation. This loan was secured by equitable mortgages on the properties. Pursuant to the doctrine of merger, these equitable mortgages were discharged upon the transfer of the properties to the foundation (thus relieving Jabs of the obligation to repay the loan).
- Pursuant to subsection 110.1(3) of the Act, Jabs elected proceeds of disposition equal to the adjusted cost base of the properties. (This entitled Jabs to a gift receipt in the amount of $8,335,751 and would avoid triggering any capital gains.) The foundation in turn sold the properties to Callahan for their fair market value of $17,745,000.
- The foundation used the proceeds from the sale of the properties to Callahan to pay off the mortgages and to loan additional money to Jabs.

Supra note 27, at paragraph 46.

The mechanism of denial is a reduction in the fair market value of the gift by the fair market value of the consideration given by the charity to acquire the non-qualifying security.


The CCRA has confirmed in several technical interpretations that the stipulation that the donee use the donor’s name in connection with assets transferred does not constitute a benefit or consideration that would deny characterization of the transfer as a gift. See, for example, infra note 51 and the discussion below under the heading “‘Gifts’ and Retention of Control.”


Supra note 35, at 396-97 (Gen. Div.).

Ibid., at 396.

Supra note 35, at paragraphs 20 and 24-25 (CA).

In the recent decision in Aids Society for Children, supra note 36, the court suggested that even where no trust obligations were imposed, a corporate charity owes its donors a fiduciary duty. However, the substance of that duty is simply to apply donated funds to the charity’s stated
charitable objects. There was no suggestion in the decision that this fiduciary duty obligated the charity to implement specific donor-expressed wishes.

43 Waters, supra note 37, at 695. While the strict rule against delegation has been modified somewhat, allowing trustees to retain professional advisers, the duty to act personally and not defer to the decisions of others, or to place the trustees’ decision making in the hands of others, remains.

44 Ibid., at 1055: “It is the first duty of the trustees to preserve the trust property and to carry out the trust terms. Unless the settlor chooses to give them such power, they have no authority to vary the terms of the trust, any more than they can neglect their duty to preserve the trust property. Nor does it matter whether the term which the trustees would like to vary is concerned with the beneficial interests created by the trust or the powers of themselves as trustees. It follows that, even if the trustees honestly and reasonably believe that it would be for the benefit of the beneficiaries were the trustees to depart in any way from any term of the trust, nevertheless they would be in breach of trust were they to do so.”

45 Arguably, if the terms of the trust require the trustees to hold some wasting asset or some investment that is expected to depreciate significantly, the trustees may be under an obligation to apply to the court to vary the terms of the trust to remove the restriction on the investment power. In an extreme case, blind adherence to the trust terms may itself constitute a breach of the trustees’ obligation to preserve the trust corpus. There are cases in which courts have held that trustees are not permitted to remain inactive merely because of the limitations imposed by the trust instrument. For example, there are a number of cases in which the administration of a trust has been paralyzed by a deadlock between co-trustees: unable to agree on a particular course of action—for example, whether to make certain investments—they take no action. Courts have expressed the view that a trustee may not be able to justify its own inaction on the grounds that it was unable to secure the co-trustee’s agreement. If there is sufficient risk to the trust or its proper administration, there is an affirmative duty to bring the matter to court and, in effect, have the court cast the deciding vote: see Fales v. Canada Permanent Trust Co., [1977] 2 SCR 302, var’g. (1974), 55 DLR (3d) 239 (BCCA), var’g. (1974), 44 DLR (3d) 242 (BCSC). In England, there is now a statutory obligation on charitable trustees to apply for a cy-près or administrative scheme if trust terms create problems in trust administration: see H. Picarda, The Law and Practice Relating to Charities, 2d ed. (London: Butterworths, 1995), 464-65.


47 This appears to have been the concern in Curlett v. Minister of National Revenue, [1966] Ex. CR 955, rev’d. on other grounds (1967), 60 DLR (2d) 752 (SCC). In this case, the taxpayer had made a gift to the Salvation Army and “pointed out” two individuals whom the taxpayer felt were in need of charitable assistance. A representative of the Salvation Army investigated the taxpayer’s recommendation and agreed that helping those individuals was within the charity’s general welfare work. Upon finding that the Salvation Army was “under no compulsion and no direction from the appellant” to assist those individuals, the court held that the taxpayer had made a bona fide charitable gift entitling him to a deduction. Presumably, an enforceable direction to assist named individuals would have required the court to treat the taxpayer’s “charitable” gift as a personal gift to those individuals merely channelled through a charity.

48 See R v. McBurney (1985), 20 ETR 283 (FCA); and Littler v. Minister of National Revenue (1978), 20 NR 541 (FCA). The position in the case law is also consistent with the definition of “gift” in Information Circular 80-10R, December 17, 1985, paragraph 29, clarifying that the tax advantage received from gifts to charities (that is, the charitable receipt) is not normally considered a benefit that negates the gift: see Friedberg v. Minister of Nat’l Revenue (1991), 135 NR 61 (FCA), aff’d. on other grounds (1993), 160 NR 312 (SCC).

49 See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. Minister of National Revenue (1966), 60 DLR (2d) 481 (SCC), in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that a gift, although subject to trust obligations, was an “absolute and indefeasible” gift that could therefore be deducted under the Estate Tax Act.
Under the US taxation regime, gifts subject to obligations reserving to the donor the power to make decisions respecting investments and distributions also qualify as charitable gifts; however, where this degree of control exists (as opposed to circumstances where the donor may give non-binding recommendations), the fund is afforded the less favourable tax treatment applied to a private foundation: see Treas. reg. section 1.507-2(a)(8), as discussed in Bjorklund, supra note 31, and M.A. Bank, “Community Foundations: Are Donor-Directed Funds New Vehicles for Utilizing Community Foundations?” (1993), 7 The Exempt Organization Tax Review 42. Some of the factors that the Internal Revenue Service will consider include the following:

- The community foundation’s solicitations (written or oral) state or imply that the donor’s advice will be followed, or the donor’s pattern of conduct creates such an expectation.
- The advice of a donor is limited to distributions of amounts from his or her fund, and the community foundation has not either made an independent investigation to evaluate whether the donor’s advice is consistent with charitable needs most deserving of support by the foundation, or promulgated guidelines enumerating specific charitable needs that it will serve (or, if such guidelines exist, they are inconsistent with the donor’s advice).
- The community foundation solicits only the donor’s advice as to distributions from the donor’s fund, and no procedure is provided for considering advice from other persons.
- The community foundation follows the advice of all donors concerning their funds substantially all of the time.


97-2 USTC paragraph 50,710 (DC DC 1997). After the decision was released, the fund amended the trust agreement under which it was established, striking out the provision allowing for donor-imposed conditions subsequent. On the basis of this change, argued on appeal, the judgment at first instance was vacated and the case remanded for reconsideration: 194 F.3d 173 (DC CA 1999).

It does appear, however, that because the restrictions were imposed as conditions subsequent, the trustee’s refusal to implement donor directions might cause the property to be returned to the donor (that is, the non-fulfillment of the condition subsequent would cause the gift to fail). Yet the court placed little stress on the possibility that the property might be returned to the donor, emphasizing instead the benefits to the donor while the property remained with the fund.

In The Fund for Anonymous Gifts, supra note 53, at 89,853 (DC DC), the IRS argued that “the structure and expected operation of the Fund reveals that it was organized to circumvent the restrictions on private foundations and limitations on charitable deductions.”

The problems that a corporate charity might face where it accepts a gift subject to trust obligations were adverted to in the Christian Brothers decision, supra note 35, at paragraph 79 (CA), where Feldman JA noted, “We do not know to what extent large charitable corporations accept donations to be held in perpetuity on trust for a particular purpose within their charitable objects, and thereby accept true trust obligations with respect to such donations. Some of the issues that would confront the corporation if it were prepared to accept a donation on such terms include: what would be involved in keeping separate accounts, how and to what extent other corporate funds could be used and applied to the operation of the trust property, the effect of the application of other funds from the charity to the purpose for its ongoing operation or for other purposes.”

In principle, it seems that to approach the matter in this way would be to disregard the discrete nature of a trust and its corpus. The well-established prohibition against the commingling of funds held in trust, either with other trust funds or with funds that the trustee holds absolutely, suggests that the foundation should effect an appropriate diversification of its investments without regard to other property being held in trust.